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CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND
PROXIMATE CAUSE*
LEoN GREEN

The attempt which common law courts have made to resolve
every major problem of legal liability in tort into terms of causal
relation marks the most glaring and persistent fallacy in tort law.
Succeeding generations of judges continue this attempt without
apparent protest. The legal mind indicates its kinship with the
common mind in no more certain way than by rejecting the simplest
truth for some complex superstructure of metaphysics. Of all the
problems of the law of torts the problem of causal relation is the
simplest, but it has become so enmeshed in meaningless terminology
that there is little hope for its rationalization. Within the last lhalf
century with rare exception has any court given the problem its
proper place in determining responsibility for tortious wrongs.
GENERAL SuRvEY
The law pertaining to negligent conduct ought not to be difficult.

It is based on the simple but broad premise of reasonable conduct in
view of the danger to those interests which would probably be hurt
by conduct less than reasonable. It becomes complex only when the
attempt is made to crystallize reasonable conduct into subsidiary
rules of exact standard such as those applied to a landowner and
intruders upon his land, master and servant, carrier and passenger,
and the various police regulations designed to regulate the conduct
of traffic and the handling of the more dangerous instrumentalities
in common use in society. Hard and fast rules are difficult of administration in any organization; they are none the less so, as rules
of law for the control of conduct in society-at-large, by the societal
agencies we call courts. In order to alleviate their severity courts
find it necessary to resort, and are warranted in so resorting, to all
the so-called technicalities they can devise. 1
* This article considers a phase of proximate cause omitted from the writer's
book, Rationale of Proximate Cause, recently published (p. 2, n. 1). Mr.
Green is Associate Professor of Law, Yale University.
I This necessity accounts very largely for the mass of decisions in tort law
turned on such points as the plaintiff's being a trespasser, technical trespasser,
bare licensee, licensee, social guest, invitee, implied invitee, business guest, and
in part, for the numerous sorts of "causes" and "conditions" encountered in
judicial opinions. Hard and fast rules require not only nice discriminations,
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The basis of the rules of law which demand reasonable conduct
-conduct not unreasonably dangerous to those legally protected
interests within its radius-is the desire to control the conduct of
those active in society most advantageously for the social order.
Our sense of fairness, justice, well-being, our desire for a well
ordered society, dictate the polity of these rules. We say to a defendant who does not conform to them that he must bear the risk
of his nonconformity and compensate another for the damage done
to his interest on account of the violation of a rule designed to protect such interest. These rules do not rest upon abstruse concepts;
their basis is not metaphysical; they rest on our desires as social beings supported by our common intelligence.R
But we likewise demand of a person, who is capable of taking
care of himself and appreciating his own interests and the dangers
thereto, that he take the same reasonable precautions for his own
interests as are required of others. If he does not do so and his
interests are hurt as a result of his own unreasonable conduct, even
though allied with unreasonable conduct on the part of another, he
must bear the loss-the whole of it. This corollary is thought to be
demanded by the same policy based on the same sense of fair play,
justice and social well-being which gives foundation to the primary
rules. 2 We call it "contributory negligence" and allow it to be invoked by a defendant, who though a wrongdoer himself, is allowed
to escape responsibility on account of the contributing unreasonable
conduct of the plaintiff. 3 Much can be said against the harshness of
but now and then require repudiation. The latter is done sometimes by palpable
fiction, sometimes by a process of legerdemain. In their efforts to minister
justice, courts make use of the technique fashioned by generations of judges,
and by virtue of its long history the technique of judging by courts is rather
highly standardized. And in this discussion the criticisms made are not levelled
at the employment of technique on the part of courts. On the contrary, my
criticisms are levelled at the practice of courts in adhering too rigidly to the
seeming logic of the rules they adminster, or in resorting to unnecessary shams
to escape them, when there are clear, wide open, legitirpate means of escape
which would make the judicial process more thoroughly rational and acceptable.
I would promote a better technique.
14 See generally, Pound: Interests of Personality, Harvard L. Rev. 343,
Selected Essays on the Law of Torts 86; Forev. Geary, 191 N. C. 90, 131 S. E.
387 (1927).
'Malcolm v. Mooresville Cotton Mills, 191 N. C. 127, 133 S. E. 7 (1926);
Moore v. Iron Works, 183 N. C. 438, 111 S. E. 776 (1922).
' "There is reason and justice in that policy of the law; it is an admonition
to every one to exercise due care for his own safety, and it authorizes another
to presume that he will do so, and so presuming, adjust his own conduct."
Holmes v. Mo. P. Ry. Co., 207 Mo. 149, 105 S. W. 624 (1907). See Beach on
Contributory Negligence, sec. 6 (1885).
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this corollary because it throws the whole risk on the plaintiff, while
it lets the defendant, also a wrongdoer, go free. The common law
courts almost -universally refused to look with favor upon the attempt
made to alleviate this harshness by allowing a plaintiff to reduce his
damages in proportion to the amount due to his own negilgence, but
the legislatures, through statutes in certain cases, 4 and, by workmen's compensation laws, have very greatly reduced the rigor of the
contributory negligence defense as applied to the most usual types
of cases, so that the rejected doctrine of comparative negligence may
eventually modify the contributory negligence rule generally. In
case of children of tender years, the common law courts have already
done away with the defense completely. 5 The same policy which
dictates the rule may likewise dictate its nullification.
But this is not all. Even though a plaintiff has been contributorily
negligent, he is not necessarily defeated of a recovery against a
defendant, if the latter had the opportunity of avoiding hurt to the
plaintiff after defendant discovered, or (in some jurisdictions)
should have discovered, the plaintiff's dangerous predicament. This
exception (in fact, merely a limitation on the corollary rule of contributory negligence) is based on the same sense of fair play, justice,
and social well-being as underlie both negligence and contributory
negligence. We think it good policy; the value we place on human
lives as well as other interests, demands it. There is no mystery
about it; it is not the subject of fine spun logic. It is based solely
on what appeals to us as a desirable thing to require. No better
reason is needed. It is as good wisdom to demand that a defendant
refrain from hurting a member of society who has put himself in a
dangerous situation, as it is in the first instance when he is entirely
cautious about his own well-being. A person who violates one rule
of law, even though it be for his own safety, is not for that reason
an outlaw and deprived of the protection afforded him by other rules
"Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 187 N. C. 288, 121 S. E. 540 (1924) ;
Mangum v. A. C. L. R. R. Co., 188 N. C. 689, 125 S. E. 548 (1924); City of
Cilia v. Luke, 28 Ga. App. 234, 110 S. E. 575 (1922) ; see sec. 3958, Va. Code

1919, making contributory negligence of plaintiff only a basis of mitigating

damages where defendant railway fails to give crossing signals and there is

collision at a crossing-State etc. Trust Co. v. N. & W. Ry. Co., 131 S. E. 331
(Va. 1926) ; Tenn. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Page,282 S. W. 376 (Tenn. 1926) ; Gordon
v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 169 N. W. 570 (Wis. 1918) ; Haffke v. Mo. P. R. Corp.,
193-N. W. 257 (Neb. 1923) ; Tampa Electric Co. v. Limpus, 91 So. 559 (1922);
Davis v. Elzey, 88 So. 630 (Miss. 1921).
'Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190 N. C. 649, 130 S. E. 638 (1926);
Fry v. So. Pub. Utilities Co. et al., 183 N. C. 281, 111 S. E. 354 (1922).
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of law designed for his benefit. This is merely good sense. But by
some unfortunate turn this policy was damned by an undignified
catch-phrase, "the last clear chance." No doubt this street name has
caused some question as to the legitimacy of the rule. At least in
some jurisdictions it is not given recognition under that name.0
We go even further; we make a corresponding limitation on the
liability of a defendant. If plaintiff has been hurt by defendant's
wrongdoing-in some instances, if only threatened-we require the
plaintiff to use reasonable care to reduce, mitigate or avoid his loss.
We call this the doctrine of "avoidable consequences." It is universally recognized even by those courts which deny its benefit to the
plaintiff under the "last clear chance" rule. It rests upon the same
grounds of policy as those discussed above and needs nothing more
profound to support it.7
It would be thought that courts would be anxious to rest decisions
made under these rules, corollaries and their limitations, upon these
considerations of policy. They are understandable, quite sufficient,
and should commend themselves without the necessity of strong
words. But evidently they do not satisfy the lawyer's instinct for
profound discourse and nice distinction. They afford little opportunity for display of "legal" learning. And it is at this point that
judges rush so precipitately into that uncharted and mystic wild of
"proximate" causation where their thirst for argumentation can be
completely quenched, and where the least can confound the wisest.
Here profundity is at her best. Here, too, our suspicions are not
without warrant.
Let it be emphasized unqualifiedly that causal relation is an element in every cause of action and in every defense. It must be
present for any action or defense to be sustained. It is a universal
:Spillers vt. Griffin, 109 So. Car. 78, 95 S. E. 133, L. R. A. 1918 D 1193;

Steele v. Burkhardt, 104 Mass. 59 (1870) ; Specht v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 233
Il. App. 384 (1924); Waldren Express & Van Co. v. King, 291 Ill. 472, 126
N. E. 97 (1920).
'Loker. v. Damon, 17 Pick. 284 (Mass. 1835); Ingraham v. Pullman Company, 190 Mass. 33, 76 N. E. 237 (1906) ; Fairfieldv. Salem, 213 Mass. 296, 106

N. E. 542 (1913) ; Den Norske Ameriekalinge Actiesselskabet v. Sun Printing &
Pub. Association, 226 N. Y. 1, 122 N. E. 463 (1919) (excellent) ; Simpson v.
City of Keokuk, 34 Iowa 568 (1872) ; Beale, Cases on Legal Liability, p. 785
et seq. This doctrine is generally considered a rule of damages. It is only
incidentally so. It is primarily a limitation upon the scope of protection

afforded a plaintiff by the rule of law violated by a defendant, just as the "last

clear chance" rule is a limitation upon the defense of contributory negligence.

It is constantly confused with the issue of causal relation, just as the damage
problem is so confused. See Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause, p. 186. But
it is purely a problem in good policy.
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for every action. A defendant's conduct must be an appreciable
factor in causing plaintiff's injury before plaintiff can recover. 7
Plaintiff's contributing negligence must be a substantial factor in his
own hurt to defeat his recovery. But when this is said, all is said.
In the overwhelming majority of suits brought and defenses interposed, this element is not only present, but so clearly so that no issue
is raised for a jury's determination. There is nothing mystifying
or profound about it. Notwithstanding this is true, the practice of
submitting the matter to the jury prevails in all common law jurisdictions. What then is there that the courts find so alluring about
causal relation, that they can neither keep away from it, nor deal
with it understandingly?
LIMITS OF LEGAL PROTECTION CONFUSED WITH
PROXIMATE CAUSE

The commonest error made by courts is in assuming that the
only elements of a plaintiff's cause of action in a negligence case are:
(1) Wrongdoing, i.e., negligence, (2> damages, and (3) causal
relation; all fact inquiries if there is any evidence raising an issue.
As I have already developed, s the most important problem that courts
have to pass upon-the one demanding the most of the judicial
function-is whether the rule plaintiff relies on for recovery and
the one violated by defendant is designed to protect plaintiff's injured
interest, and especially, against the hazard this interest has incurred.
The great majority of the problems treated as questions of proximate cause involve this inquiry and have nothing to do with causal
relation. They are pure problems of law; they arise before any of
the fact issues enumerated above are reached; a jury has no function
to perform regarding them ;sa yet they are more frequently, than not,
submitted to juries under the guise of determining proximate cause.
In so far as this is done courts abdicate their prime function to the
jury, and the results are frequently irrational.
Paul v. Railroad9 is such a case. Defendant violatect an ordinance prohibiting the blocking of crossings by trains for a longer
period than five minutes. Plaintiff started to go around to another
crossing and his mule got frightened at defendant's engine, but
" Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause, chap. 5 (1927).
Cause,
1 (1927).
Proximate
'Green,
v. Noyes, 57 N. H. 627
of Ladd,
J., chap.
in Gilman
splendid ofopinion
'a See theRationale
(1876).
S170 N. C. 230, 87 S. E. 66 (1915).
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without any further negligence on defendant's part, and ran away.
The court held that the only issue was whether the violation of this
ordinance was the proximate cause of the injury and that issue was
submitted to the jury and found in plaintiff's favor. Clearly the
blocking of the crossing was a substantial cause factor (a proximate
cause), and the violation of the ordinance being negligence per se,
plaintiff had judgment. But the only problem about which there
was any doubt was whether this ordinance was designed to protect
travellers such as plaintiff from the hazard of their teams becoming
frightened and running away. It is very doubtful that such was a
design of the ordinance. This was a problem of law for the judges,
but it passed unnoticed. The case was determined on a false issue
and that by a jury.
Another instance is Chancey v. N. & W. Ry. Co.10 Here plaintiff alleged that defendant's coach on which he was a passenger was
so over-crowded and dimly lighted that he had to stand, and in the
jam his pockets were picked. The court sustained a demurrer, but
it did so on the ground that defendant's negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's loss. This was a false basis. According to
the petition there were negligence, damages and certainly a clear
causal relation between the two. If the court was correct in its
disposition of the case it was because the rule defendant violated
and upon which plaintiff relied for recovery was not designed to
protect plaintiff against pickpockets. It was for other purposes, perhaps the personal safety and comfort of the passengers; not the
money in their pockets.
The cases in which the minor issue of causal relation has been
made to bear the burdens of the larger issue of defining the scope
of protection given by the rule violated by defendant and invoked
by plaintiff are numberless. 10'
IssuE OF NEGLIGENCE CONFOUNDED WITH
PROXIMATE CAUSE

The second most usual error made by courts in dealing with
proximate cause is the confusion of the negligence issue with the
issue of causal relation. The accepted test of negligent conduct is
the foreseeability or probability of harm, as a result of the defendant's conduct, to the interest of plaintiff (or of some one so situated)
- 174 N. C. 351, 93 S. E. 834 (1917).
" For a remarkable example of this fact see The Federal No. 2, 21 Fed.

(2d) 313 (1927).
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which has been injured. The formula runs thus: If a reasonably
prudent person, under the circumstances, would have foreseen as a
result of his conduct a probability of harm to plaintiff's injured
interest, then defendant was under a duty to use reasonable care;
failing to do so, he was negligent. If such negligence caused hurt
to such interest, there is liability. This formula is variously worded.
And one of the strangest things in the law is how the courts have
used this test both as a test of negligence and as a test of causal
relation. I have dealt with this elsewhere. 1 An example or two
will suffice here.
In Bowers v. E. T. & W. N. C. R. R. Co.,12 the only issue was
one of negligence. The court passed it over to reach the question
of causal relation, which was too clear to be an issue. The court's
discussion revolves about proximate cause and the test it states is
found in numerous cases:
"It seems from the authorities that there are two very essential
elements in the doctrine of proximate cause: (1) It must appear that
the injury was the natural or probable consequence of the negligent
or wrongful act; (2) that it ought to have been foreseen in the
light of attending circumstances."
First, it has only to be noticed to be appreciated that (1) and (2)
mean exactly the same thing; and second, it is equally clear that
neither is a test of causal relation, but merely the negligence test,
in part, repeated in different words. While the court talked in terms
of proximate cause and apparently thought it was dealing with a
causal relation issue, it was in fact using the formula for determining negligence and, fortunately, dealing with a negligence issue.
This sort of thing has been done in thousands of cases. It is never
harmful so long as the court is dealing with a negligence issue.
Usually there is no causal relation issue. So this process of perverting the negligence formula is one of those fatuous things courts
have done so long without thinking that it has become a sort of necessary ritual. The worst thing about it is that some trial judges and
many appellate judges come to take it seriously.
In the celebrated case of Drum v. Miller,13 the court made a
similar mistake. A teacher, in order to attract a student's attention,
"Are Negligence & Proximate Cause Determinable by the Same Test"
(193)I
Texas Law Rev. 243, 423; Rationale of Proximate Cause, 177, et seq.
T14 N. C. 684, 57 S. E. 453 (1907).
135 N. C. 204, 47 S. E. 421 (1904).
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threw a pencil at him. The student turned his head and the pencil
struck him in the eye, causing a very serious injury. The only
issues were those of wrongdoing: (1) whether defendant was an
intentional wrongdoer, (2) a negligent wrongdoer. But the court
almost lost those issues in its discussion of proximate cause-a very
misleading discussion on that question. The amount of confusion
that has been brought into the law by this sort of error is impossible of exaggeration. It renders the opinions of some of the ablest
courts a jumble of nonsense, though their decisions may be sound.
It gets in the way of clear and simple statement, as well as understanding. In difficult cases it frequently brings about regretable
results. The elements of negligence and causal relation are distinct.
They can be kept so. The courts ought to keep them so. There is
no excuse for not doing so. A simple test is stated in Hudson v.
Railroad:14
"What a man may reasonably anticipate is important and may be
decisive in determining whether an act is negligent, but is not at all
decisive in determining whether that act is the proximate cause of an
injury which ensues."' 15
This distinction is recognized in all well considered cases in
which the two problems are involved.
WHETHER ANY ISSUE OF NEGLIGENCE OR CAUSAL RELATION
FOR JURY, CONFUSED WITH PROXIMATE CAUSE
Very frequently it happens that plaintiff's evidence is not sufficient to raise an issue of negligence for the jury. The judge should
either non-suit the plaintiff or give a directed verdict for defendant,
depending upon the procedural requirements of the particular jurisdiiftion. This function of the judge is well recognized.'( But frequently instead of reversing a case because the trial judge did not
exercise this function, the appellate courts launch into a discussion of
what constitutes proximate cause. Their opinions purport to be
determinations of fact questions as a matter of law and are fre"142 N. C. 198, 55 S. E. 103 (1906).

But the court's attempted definition of proximate cause itself is not so suc-

cessful. No more so than that of many others. See Comment, 32 Yale Law
Journal 276; see Hall v.Rinehart & Dehnis Co., 192 N. C. 706, 135 S. E. 790
(1926), where only possible issue was negligence, yet the court confused it

with proximate causation.
"'Meropolitan Ry. Co. v. Jackson, House of Lords, 3 Appeal Cases 193
(1877) ; Kearney v. Seaboard R. Co., 158 N. C. 521, 74 S. E. 593 (1912) ; Lamb
v. Boyles, 192 N. C. 542, 135 S. E. 464 (1926).
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quently so considered by other courts. They do the same thing in
those cases in which a plaintiff's evidence fails to raise an issue of
causal relation between defendant's conduct and his hurt. Such
opinions are treacherous. All that is required of the judge in these
instances is to determine that there is no evidence raising an issue of
fact for the jury. All required of an appellate court is a review of
that ruling. This function of saying there is no issue of fact raised
by the evidence is entirely distinct from the judge's primary function
of passing on the scope of protection afforded by the rule violated
by defendant. But the two functions are both easily and frequently
confused. A keen appreciation of the respective functions of judge
and jury in the trial of a case is necessary to value the importance
of this vital distinction between the several functions of the judge
himself. 17 Although the functions of judge and jury are the most
distinctive features of the common law procedural system, and the
most frequently employed, yet strange as it may seem, few lawyers
and judges appear to have any clear understanding of them. "Questions of law for the judge, and questions of fact for the jury" is
about as far as most of them appear to have thought. This maxim
is about as true and about as misleading as most of its kind.171
ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE CONFUSED WITH
PROXIMATE CAUSE

There is no more excuse for confusing proximate cause with the
defense of contributory negligence than for confusing proximate
cause and negligence. The two are wholly distinct. Of course, a
plaintiff's contributory negligence in order to defeat him must be a
proximate cause of his injury, just as defendant's negligence must be
a proximate cause to make him responsible to plaintiff. But further
than this, the two elements are wholly distinct. Contributory negligence is merely the failure to use reasonable care for the protection
of a plaintiff's own interests. It is determined by the same formula
as a defendant's negligence. Contributory negligence necessarily
implies a causal relation. It does not have to be the "sole" cause to
, See Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N. Y. 73, 52 N. E. 679 for a close case in which
the court turned the decision both on the issues of wrongdoing and causal relation on the" absence of proof rather than the absence of negligence and causal
relation. For a fuller discussion see Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause,
chap. 4.
"I See J. B. Thayer, "Law and Fact in Jury Trials," 4 Harv. L. Rev. 147
(1890); Sunderland, "Verdicts, General and Special," 29 Yale L. J. 253, 255

(1920).
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defeat plaintiff any more than defendant's negligence has to be the
"sole" cause to make him responsible.
8
Stacy, C. J., in West Construction Co. v. A. C. L. & R. Co.,'
states the point with precision:
"The plaintiff's negligence, in order to bar a recovery in an action
like the present, need not be the 'sole' proximate cause of the injury,
for this would exclude the idea of negligence on the part of the
defendant, as in any legal sense material or significant. It is sufficient if his negligence is a cause, or one of the causes, without which
the injury would not have occurred. If the plaintiff's negligence be
the sole and only cause of the injury it would not be contributory
negligence at all, but rather the source of a self-inflicted injury."
It would seem that a matter so simple and so clear could not be
misunderstood. But here again courts of nearly all jurisdictions
have developed a confusion which mars the whole doctrine of this
defense, and especially the exceptions which are made to it. For
instance in Lea v. Southern Pub. Utilities Co.,' 9 the court says:
"It is well settled that when the plaintiff and defendant are negligent, and the negligence of both concur and continue to the time
of the injury, the negligence of the defendant is in a legal sense not
20
the proximate cause of the injury, and plaintiff cannot recover."
Such pronouncements ignore the fact that it is recognized on all
hands that there may be two or more proximate causes of an injury. 2 ' Moreover, it is wholly unnecessary to make this fictitious
distinction in order to defeat the plaintiff. The defendant's negligence may clearly be a proximate cause of the injury, and still the
plaintiff be defeated even though his negligence is also a proximate
cause. This attempt to make the plaintiff's contributory negligence
the "sole" proximate cause is not only gratuitous and fictitious, but
it ignores the true basis for defeating the plaintiff's action and introduces a false doctrine which throws the whole subject into confusion.
- 184 N. C. 179, 113, S. E. 672 (1922) ; see also Salmond on Torts (6 ed.,
1924), p. 46; Clark & Lindell on Torts (7 ed., 1921), p. 511: "The doctrine
that the plaintiff's negligence destroys the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the injury, leaves no room for any meaning to be
given to the word 'contributory,' and is open to question."
176 N. C. 511, 97 S.E. 492 (1918).
" See same statement in Hamilton v. Lumber Co., 160 N. C. 50, 75 S.E.
1087 (1912) ; Harvell v. Lumber Co., 154 N. C. 254, 70 S.E. 389.
21White v. CarolinaRealty Co., 182 N. C. 536, 109 S.E. 564 (1921) ; Wood
v. N. C. Public Service Corp., 174 N. C. 697, 94 S.E. 459 (1917) ; Albritton v.
Hill, 190 N. C. 429, 130 S.E. 5 (1925) ; Etheridge v. Norfolk Southern R. Co.,
129 S. E..680 (Va., 1925).
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In the typical case of negligence and contributory negligence the
courts are not often misled to do injustice by such an error. Buf
when they are dealing with violations of police regulations (cases of
negligence per se) and "last clear chance" situations, no result is too
preposterous to be shocking.
(a) Negligence per se Cases
Welch v. Wesson 22 is not a negligence case but it is a good beginning point. Plaintiff and defendant were engaged contrary to law
in a horse race for a purse. Defendant wilfully ran his horse into
that of the plaintiff. In a suit by plaintiff for the trespass defendant
invoked as a defense the unlawful act of plaintiff in racing horses
for a stake. The defense was not allowed. The court said:
"But neither the contract nor the race had, as far as appears
from the facts reported in the bill of exceptions, or from the intimations of the court in its ruling, anything to do with the trespass
committed upon the property of the plaintiff."
As a matter of fact the keen competition of the race likely had all
to do with defendant's running into plaintiff's horse. The causal
connection here was clear enough, but the defense was not good even
admitting the clearest causal connection. The defense failed because the rule of law plaintiff violated was not designed to protect
the defendant in his wilful trespasses, but to protect the public's interest against the evils of gambling. Plaintiff's engaging in a horse
race did not make him an outlaw. The court expressed it well:
"He who violates the law (one rule of law) must suffer its penalties; but yet in all other respects he is under its (the law's) protection and entitled to the benefit of its remedies."
This was sound ground and sufficient basis for the decision.
In another Massachusetts case, Bosworth v. Swansey,23 plaintiff
brought suit for injuries caused by defects in the highway. The
defense was that he was traveling on Sunday in violation of the
statute. The court said:
"It has been repeatedly decided that, to maintain this action, it
must appear that the accident was occasioned exclusively by the
defect of the highway; to establish which, it must appear that the
plaintiff himself is free from all just imputation of negligence or
fault. . . . It (the act of plaintiff) would show that his own
unlawful act concurred in causing the damage complained of."
=6 Gray 505 (Mass., 1856).
10 Metcalf 363 (1845).
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Thus recovery was denied because plaintiff himself was a wrongdoer. The court is clearly correct in saying there was a causal relation between traveling on Sunday and plaintiff's injury. But that
was not the question. Was the Sunday law designed to relieve defendant from its obligation to maintain the highway in repair for
plaintiff? This was the real problem. The court did not advert to
it. But the Vermont court 24 passed on the same sort of case and
met the point squarely:
"The legislature did not intend to impose a duty upon towns in
behalf of a person who was forbidden to use all highways for the
purposes of travel, and at a time when he was so forbidden to use
them. Can he be a traveller within the purview of the statute who
is forbidden to travel?

.

.

.

The plaintiff when injured was for-

bidden by law to use the highway, and by reason thereof, the defendant town owed him no duty to provide any kind of a highway, and
therefore was under no liability for any insufficiency in any highway."
Irrespective of whether this decision is agreed with, the court discovered the vital point. In cases where the violation of a statute is
the ground of defense, the primary problem is always whether the
purpose of such statute was to relieve the defendant from any obligation towards the plaintiff with reference to the injury that plaintiff
has suffered.
The frequently cited case of Sutton v. Town of Wauwatosa25 is
a case of this kind. Plaintiff was driving his cattle to market on
Sunday in violation of the statute. As they were crossing a bridge
which defendant was under obligation to maintain, the bridge, being
rotten, collapsed and many of plaintiff's cattle were killed or injured.
As a defense to plaintiff's suit, his violation of the statute was invoked. The court held the violation of the statute was no defense
to the suit. It spent most of its time in an attempt to demonstrate
that there was no causal relation between the violation of the Sunday
law and the loss of the cattle. This is the point for which the case
is most frequently decided. But it is perfectly obvious that there
was causal relation between the two. Certainly the same thing might
have happened any other day, as the court argues, but that does not
demonstrate that it did not happen on Sunday. It did. Driving the
cattle on Sunday was a factor in the results. But that does not close
the door on the plaintiff. Was this statute designed to relieve the
defendant from its obligation to keep the bridge in repair, even
Johnson v. Irasburgh, 47 Vt. 28 (1874).
"29 Wis. 21 (1871).

2

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
though plaintiff was a violator of the law?
problem and it noticed it to this extent:

That was the court's

"Wrongs or offences cannot be set off against each other in this
way. . . . Neither justice nor sound morals require this, and it
seems contrary to the dictates of both that such a defense should be
allowed to prevail."
This was good ground. It was the same as the Massachusetts court
took in Welch v. Wesson (supra). The question was one of sound
policy and the Wisconsin court took one view while the Vermont
court took the other. Which was right? There is no right and
wrong in such cases. It is a matter of judgment, good taste, an
interpretation of the community's desires; in short, law making; at
least the bounding of the scope of the protection afforded by the
rule of law in question.
There may be a lack of causal connection in some of these cases,
as for instance, suppose plaintiff in the last case had been carrying
a concealed weapon, a bottle of anti-Volstead intoxicant, or had been
standing on the bridge using profane language? It would have been
clear here that the violation of the law would not have been an
appreciable factor in the bridge's collapse. But not so the driving
of a herd of cattle on the bridge on Sunday. The lack of causal
relation is a rare ground of defense. Few cases are ever properly
turned on such point. The policy of the particular statute as construed by the court is usually the important element in such cases.
For instance, in Massachusetts an unlicensed automobile in operation
on the highway26 is in part an outlaw and its owner has no remedy
against one who negligently injures it.27 But an unlicensed operator
who is negligently hurt while operating a car on the highway is not
beyond the pale of the law, and may recover for his physical injuries
unless he is a wrongdoer in some other particular, which constitutes
contributory negligence on his part.28 The problem is not one to be
turned on the presence or want of causal relation. It is a matter of
what the court thinks is sound policy. The attempt to discover this
by tracing causal relations is entirely too tenuous and artificial. The
'Killduff v. Boston ElectricalRy. Co, 142 N. E. 98 (1924).
" But see Dudley v. Northampton St. R. Co., 202 Mass. 443, 89 N. E. 25
(1909) as to protection against reckless, wanton and wilful injuries.
'Bourne v. Whitmnan, 209 Mass. 155, 95 N. E. 404 (1911). The opinion in
this case is a strange mixture of good sense and scholasticism. But no doubt
the writer of the opinion was hard put to get away from the long line of decisions dealing with similar cases. See Armnstead v. Lounsberry, 129 Minn.
34, 151 N. W. 542, L. R. A. 1915 D, 628 (1915).
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controlling considerations are much larger, broader and more important. What are the needs and desires of the society which the
court serves? These are the factors to be weighed.
In Platz v. City of Cohoes,2 9 defendant made an excavation and
left a pile of dirt in one of its streets. Plaintiff, with her husband,
while riding on Sunday in violation of the statute, but without carelessness on the part of either, was injured by reason of their carriage being upset by the pile of dirt. Plaintiff's suit was met by the
defense that she was a wrongdoer herself. The court found no
causal relation between her violation of the law and her injury.
This seems a most strained basis for deciding the case. There was
the clearest causal relation, but that would not necessarily defeat
plaintiff's case. The court saw this also but perhaps dimly. Nevertheless the opinion contains several very apt sentences which in
themselves are a sufficient basis for the decision:
"But the object of the statute is the promotion of public order
and not the advantage of individuals. The traveler is not declared
to be a trespasser upon the street, nor was the defendant appointed
to close it against her. . . . At common law the act was not
unlawful, and the plaintiff was still under its protection, and may
resort to it against a wrongdoer by whose act she was injured."
A sentence is quoted from another noteworthy case which is even
more in point:
"We do not feel justified, therefore, on any principles of justice,
equity, or of public policy, in inflicting an additional penalty of
.$7,000 on the libelants, by way of set off, because their servants may
have been subject to a penalty of twenty shillings each for breach of
the statute." 30
Berry v.Sugar Notch Borough1 is the same sort of case. Defendant had allowed a large tree in a decayed condition to remain
standing within the street line. A violent wind blew it down and it
fell on a street car which plaintiff was operating. As a defense to
plaintiff's action defendant relied on the violation of the ordinance
regulating the speed of street cars along the streets, which ordinance
plaintiff was violating at the time his car was struck by the falling
tree. The court labored very hard to demonstrate the lack of causal
relation between the two. It is clear that the violation of such an
S89 N. Y. 219 (1882).
Phila., Wil. & Balt. R. R. Co. v. Phila. & H de G. Steam Towboat Co.,
25 How. (U. S. Sup. Ct.) 209.
3' 191 Pa. 345, 43 AtI. 240 (1899).
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ordinance should not defeat a recovery by plaintiff. The court's
decision is correct, but there was no need of disputing a causal relation which was too clear for doubt. The defense should fail because
the ordinance plaintiff violated was not designed to relieve the defendant from its duty to remove decayed trees likely to cause injury
to travelers on the streets. The scope of the ordinance fell far short
of such purpose.
The same analysis holds good as to common law rules which a
plaintiff may violate but which were not designed to relieve defendant from its duties under other and different common law rules.
Smithwuick v. Hall & Upson Co. 3 2 is an apt case of this sort. Plaintiff, an employee of defendant, ventured out on a part of a platform
used in connection with an ice house where it was very dangerous
to work. He had been warned not to work out there as he might fall
or slip, and it being unprotected by railings he would be thrown below
and hurt. While the plaintiff was out on this dangerous part of the
platform, the brick wall of the building above the platform, in consequence of the negligence of defendant, gave way, the brick falling
upon the platform where plaintiff was and thence to the ground.
Plaintiff was struck by the brick and thrown to the ground. As a
defense to a suit for his injuries, defendant invoked plaintiff's contributory negligence. The court spends considerable time speculating
whether plaintiff's wrongful conduct had anything to do with his
injuries, that is, whether it was "one of the proximate causes and
not merely a condition." Finally the court concludes:
"Whether the claim that he would probably not have fallen had
he remained where he was stationed be true or not, must forever
remain matter of conjecture. But if its truth could be demonstrated
it would not, as we have seen, change the relation of the plaintiff's
act to the legal cause of his injury, or make that act, from a legal
standpoint, a contributing cause where it was but a condition."
In other words, not being able honestly to say that plaintiff's conduct
was not one of the proximate causes of his injuries, the court resorts
to a fiction, "legal cause," which has often been employed in such
situations, as a way out of the difficulty. This fiction is wholly
useless if the problem is fully analysed. Fictions serve good purposes only when there is nothing better. They obscure rational
thought process. Any "constructive" or "legal" or "in law" device
for reaching a conclusion is justly the subject of suspicion. The
' 59 Conn. 261, 21 Atl. 924 (1890).
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way out for the court in this situation is very clear. It is this. The
rule that plaintiff violated was not designed to relieve the defendant
from its obligation owed to its employee to furnish him a reasonably
safe place about which to work. The purpose of the common law
rule which plaintiff violated did not go that far; the hazard towards
which it was directed was entirely different, to-wit, the hazard of
slipping off an unprotected platform while engaged about his work,
not the hazard of being crushed under bricks from a collapsed wall
of the building. Plaintiff did not become an outlaw by being contributorily negligent. His negligence did put him in a dangerous
place and contributed to his hurt. But irrespective of such causal
relation, defendant's obligation as to the safety of the wall was in
no wise affected. Plaintiff was still entitled to its protection. It is
exactly the same question as is involved in the case of statutes.
The courts are called upon to define the scope of the respective rules
involved. They cannot be offset one against the other. This is a
matter of defining the scope of legal rules based upon what, for the
lack of ability to enumerate all the factors to be taken into consideration, we call sound policy. If the rule which a plaintiff has violated
does not give a defendant relief from an obligation owing plantiff
imposed by some other rule of law, then such contributory negligence, however clear a causal relation can be traced between it and
plaintiff's hurt, affords defendant no ground of defense. The respective rights and duties of the parties are turned on much more
important factors than mere causal relations.88
In Graham v. City of Charlotte4 plaintiff was riding on a truck
in violation of an ordinance providing ". . . no person when riding, shall allow any part of his body to protrude beyond the limits
of the vehicle. . . ." The defendant had negligently placed and
maintained a heavy post in the edge of the street, and without any
negligence of the driver of the truck it was driven so close to this
post as to crush plaintiff's limb and foot so that he became a cripple
for life. Defendant was negligent and plaintiff was negligent per so
by virtue of violating an ordinance. The court prevented plaintiff's
' There are numerous cases of this sort. Wagner v. Mo. P. Ry. Co., 97

Mo. 512, 10 S. W. 486 (1888); N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Ball, 53 N. J. L.

283, 21 Atl. 1052 (1891) ; Webster v. Rome W. & 0. R. Co., 115 N. Y. 112, 21
N. E.725 (1889); Gray v. Scott, 66 Pa. 345 (1870) ; Bowman v. Humphrey
(Iova, 1906), 109 N. W. 714; Montambault v. Waterbury & M. T. Co., 98
Conn. 554, 120 Atl. 145 (1923); Reiter-Conley Mfg. Co. v. Hamlin (Ala.,
1906),
& T. Ry. Co. (Tex., 1899), 50 S.W. 559.
'18640N.So.C.280;
648,Belcher
120 S. v.
E. M.
466K.(1923).
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defeat by resolving the issue into one of proximate cause and sustaining the jury's finding that plaintiff's negligence did not contribute
to his injury. This was as untrue as it was unnecessary. Plaintiff's
violation of the ordinance was as substantial a factor in the results
as any other one cause. The causal relation was as strong as it
could be. But the purpose of the ordinance plaintiff violated was
not to relieve the defendant of responsibility for obstructions negligently maintained in the street, nor to protect the plaintiff from such
obstructions. Doubtless the type of hazard aimed at by the ordinance
was that ordinarily produced by hanging outside of vehicles in an
.area of crowded traffic. No such risk as plaintiff encountered was
sought to be protected against. Thus the court converted a simple
problem of statutory construction-a defining of the limits of protection afforded by a rule of law-into one of causal relation to the
further confounding of that already confused subject. This has
'been done almost too often to deserve protest, but it is none the less
a vicious way of arriving at a good result; a way that leads to error
in cases not so clear.
In Hinton v. Southern Ry Co.,3 5 we have an entirely different
-case. Plaintiff was driving her car in violation of a statute prohibiting speed in excess of seven miles per hour when approaching an
intersecting highway. In this case the highway was a railway crossing. Defendant negligently let the gates to the crossing down immediately in front of plaintiff's car, which caused her to turn her car
into a building with the result that she was injured. Defendant
relied on plaintiff's contributory negligence as a defense. She was
-negligent per se. But the court said:
"She should not be prevented from recovering solely because she
was moving in excess of the statutory speed unless, as stated, such
violation was clearly the proximate cause of the injury."
'hat plaintiff's violation of the statute was a very substantial contributing factor in her injury, and this is all that is required, was very
clear. But the court said that such question could not be withdrawn
from the jury. Thus the plaintiff was allowed to recover behind the
smoke screen of proximate cause. Perhaps the court should be
commended for the decision. But was there not a more rational
way out?
This is a different type of case from those we have been discussing. Here the purpose of the rule violated was to control traffic
" 172 N. C.587, 90 S. E. 756 (1916).
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and that under the very sort of condition that plaintiff found herself
faced with. So far as logic is concerned this was a simple case of
negligence and contributory negligence and plaintiff should have
had no recovery. But the rule plaintiff violated is a hard and fast
one, allowing no flexibility. Seven miles per hour is a very low
rate of speed even at intersections. If determined by the common
law standard plaintiff was doubtless not negligent; she was only so
by virtue of violating a statute. Legislative attempts at making
exact standards of conduct are perhaps desirable, but that does not
mean that inexorable logic will be or must be followed in all such
cases. About the only utility of the fantastic doctrines of proximate
cause is that they can be used as a smoke screen in these cases.
After awhile perhaps when courts come to see that logic is not the
life of the law they will do openly what they now do timidly and
covertly. There are other ways around which are more sensible.
For instance a court could conceivably hold that these regulations
are merely police regulations and should not affect the civil rights or
liabilities of parties.3 6 The issue of negligence and contributory
negligence would then always be an open one. It is held by some
courts that such violations are mere evidence of negligence. This
likewise leaves the issue open as at common law and allows flexibility. This is the method adopted by the New York and Massachusetts courts.3 7 It is on this basis (although the lack of proximate cause is also erroneously thrown in) that the Massachusetts
court holds an unlicensed driver, although the violator of a law
designed to control and regulate traffic, is not necessarily negligent in driving a car without license, and if hurt by a collision on
the highway is not thereby defeated by the doctrine of contributory
negligence. This issue is left open to be determined by the common
law rule. As already noted the same court is not so liberal when
an unlicensed vehicle on the highway is injured. There the doctrine
of negligence per se is carried to its logical extremity. Since the
rule is designed to control traffic on the highway, an unlicensed automobile becomes a trespasser beyond the protection of the common
law rule of negligence. The North Carolina court in the case under
'See

the suggestion in Bourne v. Whitman, infra 37, and in Dudley v.
Y. 488 (1881) ; Corbett v. Scott,
243 N. Y. 66, 152 N. E. 467 (1926); Bourne v. Whitman, 209 Mass. 155, 95
N. E. 404 (1911) ; see 20 Col. Law Rev. 710; Artnstead v. Lounsberry, 129
Northampton, supra N. 27, and cases cited.
" Knupfle v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84 N.

Minn. 34, 151 N. W. 542 (1915) ; Hausen v. Kemmich, 208 N. W. 277 (Iowa,

1926).
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discussion while accepting the logic of the rule in so far as the plaintiff is held to be negligent per se, avoids its severity by holding that
there is still the issue of proximate cause which must be left to the
jury. The jury appreciating the arbitrariness of the rule usually
finds for the plaintiff. The only thing that can be said for the latter
holding is that it is one way of avoiding the harshness of the statute.
But it does it at the expense of further cluttering an already much
abused doctrine. Moreover it abdicates to the jury a function that
only a judge should exercise. 38 The upshot of decisions like this is
that in so far as the violation of a police regulation constitutes contributory negligence, that defense is broken down. To this extent
there is a divergence in the policy of states which hold as Massachusetts does and states which hold as North Carolina does. It is
not a mere juggling of causal relations as appears on the surface 3 81
(b) Last Clear Chance Exception
The "Last Clear Chance" exception to the contributory negligence rule begins with Davies against Mann3 9-the celebrated hobbled ass case-and figuratively speaking is restricted to that type of
case. This exception was there stated very simply:
"The defendant has not denied that the ass was lawfully in the
highway, and therefore we must assume it to have been lawfully
there; but even were it otherwise, it would have made no difference,
for as the defendant might, by proper care (at this stage of the
matter) have avoided injuring the animal, and did not, he is liable
for the consequences of his negligence, though the animal may have
been improperly there."
The parenthesis "at this stage of the matter" was added by a
"Zagier v. Southern Express Co., 171 N. C. 692, 89 S. E. 43 (1916) is
another such case. See the dictum in Ledbetter v. English, 166 N. C. 125, 81
S. E. 1066 (1914). See also, Tenn. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Page, 282 S. W. 376
(1926). There are not many such cases, for usually the situation is like Graham v. City of Charlotte, surpa, where the rule violated by plaintiff was not
designed to protect against the hazard which was encountered. When this is
the case, the decisions can be placed on sound ground, but such is seldom
done. The morass of proximate cause is too alluring for the courts to pass by.
"a See following authorities as pertinent to the analysis: "Negligence as
Proximate Cause of Injury," 58 Pa. L. Rev. 306; Pollock on Torts (12 ed.),
197 (1923) ; Dohin v. Cordoza & Bro., 206 N. W. 377 (Minn., 1925) ; Hansen
v. Keinmish, 208 N. W. 277 (Iowa, 1926) (hard case); Cahoon v. Ry. Co., 90
Iowa 169, 57 N. W. 727 (1894); Martin v. Ry. Co., 118 Iowa 148, 91 N. W.
1034, 59 L. R. A. 698, 96 Am. St. Rep. 371 (1902) ; Schaar v. Comforth, 151
N. W. 275 (Minn., 1915) ; Floaten v. Lyons, 196 N. W. 478 (Minn., 1923).
"10 M. & W. 546 (1842).
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latter case 40 and this was a necessary qualification in order to prevent the exception from being a complete repudiation of the rule
itself. The exception is a severe limitation on the contributory
negligence rule.
The decisions have developed two branches of the exception. In
one liability is restricted to instances in which the plaintiff's dangerous situation is actually discovered and appreciated by the defendant
in time for the latter by the exercise of reasonable care to prevent
injury to plaintiff. This is the doctrine of "discovered peril." All
courts in one guise or another accept this branch.
The other branch goes a step further and includes those instances
in which the defendant by the exercise of reasonable care should
have discovered and appreciated plaintiff's peril in time to have prevented his hurt by the exercise of reasonable care. Whether this
branch of the exception is accepted is purely a matter of policy like
that of the first, and whether it shall be fully accepted or only as to
certain types of cases is none the less a matter of policy. Many
courts do not recognize this branch. There is not much room for
taking the one side or the other. It is not a question of right or
wrong. It is purely a matter of which interest, in a particular case,
society prizes most highly. Either plaintiff or the defendant, under
the common law rule, must bear the risk-which shall it be? The
cases range themselves on the one side or the other of this branch
of the exception as the courts of the respective jurisdictions value
the interests involved in view of what the social wants and desires
of their jurisdictions are interpreted to be.
Under either branch there is much room for differences of opinion as to when a person has been, or should have been, discovered in
peril. Is a person standing on a railway track engaged in conversation, about his work, in reverie, walking down the track, walking
towards the track, when at any moment he could become conscious
of his peril and step out of it, a person in peril? Clearly he may be
just as much so as a drunk or epileptic on the track, but the difficulty
arises in saying when the engineer must appreciate, or has appreciated, the peril of such person, sufficiently to require measures to be
taken to avoid hurting him. Such cases vary infinitely in their cir'*'Radley v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 1 Appeal Cases 754 (1876);
Salmond, Law of Torts (6th ed., 1921), p. 41: "When an accident happens
through the combined negligence of two persons, he alone is liable to the other
who had the last opportunity of avoiding the accident by reasonable care."
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cumstances. 41 Much discussion has raged about the application of
the rules to these cases, but no far reaching principle of law is involved, unless it is whether good policy would not require in all
cases in which human life is at stake, that the benefit of the doubt
should be given it as opposed to all other interests. The Missouri
courts have apparently settled the difficulties of the problem at least
as to railways and automobiles by accepting the rule as based on
this broad policy. 42 It is inevitable that in bounding the scope of
the exception nice discriminations have to be made.
But the most startling observation about the development of this
exception is the quickness with which it became lost in the limbo of
proximate cause. It had hardly secured a footing before the courts
and writers began to demand a sounder basis for it than that afforded
by the good sense apparent from the simple statement of the rule
itself. They found that basis in tracing out, and the identification
of, causes. The following excerpts indicate how they found it.
"In some cases there may have been negligence on the part of the
plaintiff remotely connected with the accident, and in those cases the
question arises whether the defendant by the exercise of ordinary
care and skill might have avoided the accident, notwithstanding the
negligence of the plaintiff, as in the oft-quoted donkey case. There,
although without negligence of the plaintiff the accident could not
have happened, the negligence is not supposed to have contributed to
the accident within the rule upon this subject."43
"The rule has been misunderstood and misapplied. It means only
that that negligence upon the part of the plaintiff which bars his
See generally Pickett v. Wilmington & W. R. R. Co., 117 N. C. 616, 23

S. E. 264 (1895) ; Gahagan v. Moston & Maine R. R., 70 N. H. 441, 50 Adt.
146 (1900) ; Goodrich, "Applications of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine," 5
Iowa Law Bul. 36-56; Notes 22 Col. Law Rev. 745; 21 Mich. Law Rev. 586;
15 Cal. Law Rev. 43; Bohlen, 66 Pa. Law Rev. 73; Annotations 28 A. L. R.
283; 46 A. L. R. 1047; 5 North Carolina L. Rev. 58; 9 Va. L. Rev. 237.
" See Hutchinson v. St. L. & M. R. R. R. Co., 88 Mo. App. 376 (1901).
This is the so-called "Humanitarian" doctrine, and the court in this case
assumed, and numerous other courts have assumed, that there is some vital
distinction between this and the "Last Clear Chance" doctrine. There is not.
But the Missouri courts are more liberal toward human life in construing the
defendant's duty to discover a plaintiff's peril than are the courts in most
jurisdictions, and also take no account of a defendant's prior conduct so long
as plaintiff's peril is discovered in time to prevent hurting him. See Banks v.
Morris & Co., 302 Mo. 254, 257 S.W. 482 (1924) ; Moore v. St. Louis & S.
F. R. Co., 283 S. W. 732 (1926). See 13 Va. L. Rev. 326. But in railway
and automobile cases there is perhaps a general tendency towards the liberal
policy of the Missouri courts. See note, 23 Mich. Law Rev. 668.
"Lord Campbell in Dowell vi. Navigation Co.. 5 Ellis & B. 195 (1855),
quoted with approval in Tuff v. Warman, 2 C. B. N. S.740, 5 C. B. N. S. 573,
27 L. J. C. P. 263, 267 (1857).

24

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

recovery from the defendant must have been a proximate cause of
the injury, and that it is not a proximate but only a remote cause of

the injury, when the defendant, notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence, might44by the exercise of ordinary care and skill have avoided
the injury."
"A negligent act of the plaintiff does not become contributory
unless the proximate cause of the injury; and although the plaintiff
in going on the track, may have been negligent, when he was struck
down and rendered unconscious by a bolt of lightning his conduct
as to what transpired after that time was no longer a factor in the
occurrence, and, as all the negligence imputed to defendant on the
first issue arose after plaintiff was down and helpless, the responsibility of defendant attached because it negligently failed to avail
itself of the last clear chance to avoid the injury; so its negligence
became the sole proximate cause of the injury; and the act of the
plaintiff in going on the track even though negligent in the first instance,45became only the remote and not the proximate or concurrent
cause"

The courts in practically all jurisdictions accepted this rationalization of the doctrine. By this method of reasoning the only
limitation placed upon the contributory negligence rule was the failure of plaintiff's negligence to be a proximately contributing factor,
which meant it was not contributory negligence at all. 40 This was
the ground on which the exception was explained. As so explained
it was not an exception at all and did not in anywise conflict with
the contributory negligence rule. This is the end both courts and
writers desired to reach. And, curious as it may seem, many able
courts and writers still insist upon this empty explanation.
Sir Frederick Pollock states his conclusion as follows

:47

"This leaves no doubt that the true ground o4 contributory negligence being a bar to recovery is that it is the proximate cause of the
mischief; and negligence on the plaintiff's 48part which is only part
of the inducing causes will not disable him.
"On the whole, then, if the plaintiff's fault, whether of omission
or of commission, has been the proximate cause of the injury, he is
" Patterson, Railway Accident Law, 51. See also to the same effect: Beach,
Contributory Negligence, secs. 10 & 11 (1885) ; Wharton on Negligence, sec.
323, et. seq. (1874); Thompson on Negligence, sec. 1157 (1880); see same
author's second ed. (1901), secs. 230-241.
"Edge v. Atlantic C. L. Ry. Co., 153 N. C. 212, 69 S. E. 74 (1919). See
McLamb v. The W. & W. R. R. Co., 122 N. C. 862, 29 S. E. 894 (1898) ; also
see Gunter v. Wicker, 85 N. C. 310 (1881) ; Nashua Iron & Steel Co, v. Worcester & Nashua R. R. Co., 62 N. H. 159 (1882).
" See supra, note 18.
" Pollock, The Law of Torts (12 ed., 1923), pp. 463 et seq.
" Page 468.
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without remedy against one also in the wrong. On the other hand,
if the defendant's fault has been the proximate cause he is not excused merely by showing that the plaintiff's fault at some earlier
stage created the opportunity for the fault which was that cause. 49
"In regard to the latter class of cases, such as Davies v. Mann and
Radley v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., the rule may be stated thus: That he
who last has an opportunity of avoiding the accident, notwithstanding the negligence of the other, is solely responsible. And the ground
of both rules is the same; that the law looks to the proximate cause,
or, in other words, will not measure out responsibility in lalves or
other fractions, but holds that person liable who was in the imain the
cause of the injury." 50
" Page 471.
' This distinguished author writes as though proximate cause were the
most definite thing, and that it could be ascertained by a yardstick. It seems
to me that the author and many others, as well as courts, are sometimes misled
by confusing "sole responsibility" and "sole cause." Of course a defendant
who had the last clear chance is "solely responsible," but this does not mean
that he was, or must be found to be, the "sole cause." See Shearman & Redfield, Negligence (6 ed., 1913), sec. 99. Here the doctrine of contributory negligence and the last clear chance exception are stated well, but at the very last
the authors seemed to have added out of an abundance of precaution this innocuous sentence: "His (defendant's) negligence and not that of the one first
in fault is the sole proximate cause of the injury." No writer seems to have
escaped the dead weight of this constantly reiterated absurdity.
Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (7th ed., 1921), p. 505: "The ground of the
defendant's liability in such a case is not that he was anymore negligent than
the plaintiff, for both were guilty of a want of ordinary care, and there was
nothing in the facts to impose a,greater obligation to exercise that care upon
one party than upon the other; nor is it that the defendant's negligence was
later in time than that of the plaintiff, for the negligence of the plaintiff in
omitting to remove his person or property from its position of danger continued down to the moment of the accident just as much as did the defendant's omission to take care; it is simply that the latter being in notion was the
one who actually did the damage. He is responsible who was the efficient
cause." These authors face the facts candidly, but cannot resist the temptation
of placing their conclusion on the basis of causes. The idea of the sole
activity of defendant will, of course, not stand up.
Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, p. 1008, 1270 (1927): "The
doctrine of contributory negligence is a part of the general doctrine of proximate cause, which says that a man shall not be held responsible for the consequences of his wrongful acts except so far as they are the proximate results
of those acts. . . ." "The doctrine of last clear chance, sometimes called
the humanitarian or discovered peril doctrine, is a phase of the doctrine of
proximate cause.

.

.

."

This writer seems merely to be reflecting the state-

ments of hundreds of opinions to this general effect.
Nehring v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 109, 84 At. 301, 45 L. R A. (N. S.)
896 (1912) ; Tullock v. Connecticut Co., 94 Conn. 201, 108 Atl. 556 (1919) ;
De Noma v. Sioux Falls Traction Systen, 39 S.D. 10, 162 N. W. 746 (1917) ;
Mosso v. E. H. Stanton Co., 75 Wash. 220, 134 Pac. 941, L. R. A. 1915 A. 943;
Teakle v. San Pedro, L. & A. S. L. R. Co., 32 Utah 276, 90 Pac. 402, 10 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 486 (1907) ; Osgood v. Maxwell, 78 N. H. 35, 95 AtI. 954 (1915) ;
Drown v. Northern Ohio Traction Co., 76 Ohio 234, 81 N. E. 326, 10 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 421 (1907); Dyer v. C. C. P. & L. Co., 120 Me. 411, 115 Atl. 194
(1921); Dyerson v. Union Pac.R. R. Co., 74 Kan. 528, 87 Pac. 680 (1906) ;
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Some states have refused to recognize the exception by "the last
clear chance" name. Nevertheless, they have recognized it. The
Massachusetts case of Steele v. Burkhardt5l indicates the method
employed by the courts which reach the same result by a supposedly
different route. In that case, plaintiff had backed his wagon to the
curb and left his team standing cross-wise the street in violation of
an ordinance. There was still enough room to pass between the
front of the team and the opposite curb. But defendant negligently
drove his team and wagon over and upon the hoof of plaintiff's
horse. To plaintiff's suit defendant interposed the defense of contributory negligence. The court said:
"So the evidence that the plaintiff's team was standing in the
street in violation of a city ordinance was admissible to show negligence on his part. It did show negligence in respect to keeping the
ordinance, but did not -necessarilyshow negligence that contributed
to the injury. . . . In such a case he must prove that his position was not so carelessly taken as to contribute to the collision. The
fact is here found that it was not so taken, thoughiit was in violation
of the ordinance. There was therefore no such negligence on his
part as to defeat the action."
The court found that plaintiff's contributory negligence was not
a proximate cause of his injury. This is the position taken by the
other courts which deny the doctrine.5 2 These courts are much more
logical than are those numerous courts which recognize the last clear
chance exception but straightway attempt to base it upon an absence
of proximate causation. The exception is not needed if proximate
causation is its basis, as the courts of Illinois, Massachusetts and
South Carolina have demonstrated. It is just so much excess baggage. Why be bothered with -it? But as a matter of fact the exception is not founded upon the absence of proximate cause between
plaintiff's negligence and his injury. Nor do these courts which
claim to deny the exception actually do so. What they do is this:
8
if the case
In a last clear chance situation as in Steele v. Burkhardt,"
is a strong one for the plaintiff, the court will declare as a matter of
Pilmer v. Boise Traction Co. (Idaho, 1908), 94 Pac. 432; Grand Trunk Rv.

Co. v. McAlpine (1913), A. C. 838; Canadian Pac. Ry Co. v. Frechett (1915),
A. C. 871; and see Comment 29 Yale Law Journal, 896-901.
' 104 Mass. 59 (1870).
' Darwin v. Charlotte C. & A. R. R. Co., 23 So. Car. 531 (1885) ; Farley
v. CharlestonBasket & Veneer Co., 51 So. Car. 222, 28 S. E. 193, 401 (1897) ;
Clyde v. So. Pub. Utilities Co., 109 So. Car. 290, 96 S. E. 116 (1918) ; Waldren
Express & Van Co. v. Krug, 291 Ill. 472, 126 N. E. 97 (1920).
" Supra, note 51.
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law that there is no proximate cause between plaintiff's negligence
and his injury. If they think it doubtful, they leave the matter to
the jury to find whether plaintiff's negligence contributed to his injury proximately, and under their short range tests of proximate
cause, the jury will normally find that it did not. Good results are
achieved by a repudiation of a factual causal relation of the clearest
sort. This is merely another instance of circumventing by a fiction
what could be better done by the frank acceptance of the exception.
Another shift of these courts in such cases is to consider the defendant's negligence reckless, wanton or gross. Plaintiff's wrongdoing
is then not a defense to defendant's more serious conduct. This
process is made clear by an excerpt from Cooley on Torts :54
"If therefore, the defendant discovered the negligence of the
plaintiff in time, by the use of ordinary care to prevent the injury,
and did not make use of such care for the purpose, he is justly
chargeable with reckless injury, and cannot rely upon the negligence
of the plaintiff as a protection. Or it may be said that in such a
case the negligence of the plaintiff only put him in a position of
danger, and was, therefore, only the remote cause of the injury,
while the subsequently intervening negligence of the defendant was
the proximate cause." 55
This marks a tendency even among courts which recognize the last
clear chance doctrine. 56 There is no need for this extra twist if
once the exception is recognized. But courts often fail to realize
when they have struck sound bottom. They are apparently ever on
the lookout for some really nice point of distinction.
A great many courts are beginning to see the utter futility of
tying up the last clear chance exception with the follies which have
been committed in the name of proximate cause. At least in a
great many cases the doctrine is being stated without any reference
to proximate cause, and many that refer to it at all do so with slight
57
if any emphasis. In Haynes v. Southern Ry. Co., Stacy, J., in a
"3 Ed. 1906, p. 1443.
"See Murphy v. Deane, 101 Mass. 455 (1896); Aiken v. Holyoke Street
Ry. Co., 184 Mass. 269, 68 N. E. 238 (1903) ; Banks v. Braman, 188 Mass. 367,

472, 126
74 N. E. 594 (1905) ; Waldren Express & Van Co. v. Krug, 291 Ill.
N. E. 97 (1920).
"See Note, 8 Minn. Law Rev. 329-35; Bohlen, 66 Pa. Law Rev. 73; Wilson
v. Traction Co., 111 Texas 361, 234 S. W. 663 (1921); Mueller v. Dewey, 159
Minn. 173, 198 N. W. 428 (1924); Moreno v. Lot Angeles Transfte Co., 44
Cal. App. 551, 186 Pac. 800 (1920); Gamble v. Uncle Sam Oil Co., 100 Kan.
74, 163 Pac. 627, L. R. A. 1917 D. 875; Dildine Flynn, 116 Kan. 563, 227 Pac.
340 (1924) ; Sherman & Redfield on Negligence (6 ed., 1913), sec. 64, p. 159.
182 N. C. 679, 110 S. E. 56 1921.
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clear cut opinion states the doctrine with admirable accuracy and
simplicity:
"It has been held uniformly with us that, notwithstanding the
plaintiff's contributory negligence, if the jury should find from the
evidence that the defendant, by the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care, could have avoided the injury, and failed to do so, and had
to so avoid it, then the defendant would be
the last clear chance
58
liable in damages."
In Gunter's Adm'r v. Southern Ry. Co.,59 is found another clear
expression by Burke, J.:
"After the defendant's negligence has been established, if it be
shown that the plaintiff also was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to his injury, there cannot, as a general rule, be
any recovery, as the courts will not lend their aid to apportion the
injury between two wrongdoers. But this rule is a harsh one, and
at times works great hardships, so that the courts have felt compelled to qualify it, or make an exception to it, independently of
cases specially provided for by statute, and to declare that, while the
general rule would be enforced in cases where the negligence of
both parties was concurrent, and continuous down to the time of the
injury, they would not enforce it, but would allow a recovery in
that class of cases, where, although the plaintiff had been negligent
in the first instance and that negligence had proximately contributed
to his injury, there was an appreciable interval of time between the
plaintiff's negligence and his injury, during which the defendant by
the exercise of ordinary care, could and ought to have avoided the
effects of the plaintiff's prior negligence, but failed to do so. This
is a just and humane qualification or exception, and is generally
designated as the doctrine of the 'last clear chance'." 00
Sir John Salmond, a standard text writer, 1 leaves little to be
said by way of clarifying the confusion that has been produced by
the effort to place the exception on the basis of causal relation.
He says:
"Attempts are often made to simplify it by resorting to the theory,
or at least the language, of causation, and by applying some distinguishing adjective to the kind of causation which makes the defendant liable, notwithstanding the negligence of the plaintiff. We
find it said, for example, that the defendant is not liable unless his
negligence was a direct cause of the accident, or the immediate cause,
or the decisive cause, or the proximate cause, or the real efficient,
in Ray v. Railroad, 141 N. C.84, 53 S. E. 622 (1906).
statement
a like
(Va., 1920).
101 S.
E. 885
"" See
' See also Va. Ry. & Power Co. v. Leland, 129 S. E. 700 (Va., 1925).
' Salmond on The Law of Torts (6 ed., 1921).

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
or effective cause, or the causa causans as opposed to a mere condition or causa sine qua non. If these terms are used merely as legal
nomenclature, and with reference to definite legal principles independently established, they may be unobjectionable. If, however,
as usually happens, they are used as if they were themselves illuminative and possessed of some independent logical significance, capable of application to the problems of contributory negligence, their
use is merely a deceptive substitute for the formulation of definite
legal principles."
There is no honest escape from the position taken by these
authorities, and to attempt to escape by a resort to a lack of causal
relation is a useless attempt to climb down the back way; the state02
ment of the exception carries on its face all the support it needs.
The unsoundness of the "proximate cause" basis of the exception
may be demonstrated in another fashion. If the negligence of both
plaintiff and defendant cause the injury of a third person, both plaintiff and defendant may be held liable, even though the defendant had
the last clear chance. Clearly plaintiff could not be held unless his
negligence was a proximate cause of the injury. Nor can plaintiff
defend on the ground that defendant had the last clear chance.0 3
' Schofield, Davies v. Mann: "Theory of Contributory Negligence," 3 Harvard Law Rev. 263 (1890); Bohlen, "Contributory Negligence," 21 Harvard
Law Rev. 233, 241, 258; 5 Cornell Law Quarterly 486; 22 Columbia Law Review 745; 57 Am. Law Rev. 115; 37 Harvard Law Rev. 625; Kinney v. Chicago & G. W. R. Co., 17 Fed. (2d) 708 (C. C. A., 1927); Bogan v. Carolina
Central R. R., 129 N. C. 154, 39 S. E. 808 (1901) ; Freeman v. Schulz (Colo.,
1927), 256 Pac. 631; Read v. Pacific Electric R. Co., 185 Cal. 520, 197 Pac. 791
(1921); Arnold v. San Francisco-OaklandTerminal R. Co., 175 Cal. 1, 164
Pac. 798 (1917) ; Wilson v. So. Traction Co., 111 Tex. 366, 234 S. W. 663
(1925); Peterson v. New Orleans R. & Light Co., 142 La. 835, 77 So. 647
(1918) ; Southern Ind. Gas & Electric Co. v. Harrison, 151 N. E. 703 (Ind.,
1926) ; Levein v. Rhode Island Co., 43 R. I. 167, 110 Atd. 602 (1920) ; Joyner
v. Interurban R. Co., 172 Iowa 727, 154 N. W. 936 (1915) ; Graupner v. Wells,
260 S.W. 521, 214 Mo. App. 163 (1924) ; Towbermain v. Des Moines City Ry.
Co., 211 N. W. 854 (1927) ; Banks v. Morris & Co., 302 Mo. 254, 257 S. W.
482 (1924); McGowan v. Tayman, 132 S.E. 316 (Va., 1926). In this last case
the court mars a good statement by adding a meaningless statement at the
conclusion as to proximate cause. In Buckner v. Southern Ry. Co., 138 S.E.
538 N. C. (1927), the court clearly places the decision of a difficult case on
the Davies v. Mann doctrine, but adds an unnecessary sentence: "The failure
of the engineer . . . was the proximate cause of the injury." Such statements are but the echoes of the confusion which has reigned so long. The
same able judge who wrote the opinion in this case handled a far more difficult one in Lawrence v. Yadkin River Power Co., 190 N. C., 130 S. E. 735
(1925) without becoming entangled in the complexities of causation.
' Cordiner v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 5 Cal. App. 400, 91 Pac. 436
(1907); Spear v. United Railroads of S. F., 16 Cal. App. 637, 117 Pac. 956
(1911); Austin Electric Ry. Co. v. Faust, 133 S.W. 449 (1910) ; see Notes, 47

L. R. A. (N. S.1081); 37 Harvard Law Rev. 625; see Pollock's attempt to

avoid this difficulty by saying: "Thus it appears that the term 'proximate' is-
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It is a simple case of two or more proximate causes producing the
64
injury, any one or more of which can be held responsible.
(c) FurtherException to ContributoryNegligence Rule
A still further exception to the contributory negligence rule has
been made which will doubtless in time be generally recognized.
Several examples may be given:
Plaintiff's intestate is negligent in driving on a crossing without
looking or listening for a car. The motorman is negligent in driving his car too -fast, discovers deceased in time to stop his car and
prevent hurting him, but he cannot stop on account of the negligence of defendant in sending out a car with bad brakes. Plaintiff
is allowed to recover.0 5
Plaintiff's intestate negligently walked upon defendant's bridge
at night. People were accustomed to trespass upon defendant's
tracks at this point. On account of the motorman's running without
a good light he was unable to discover the intestate in time to stop
his car so as to prevent striking him. A recovery was allowed.00
Defendant's train was being run at an unlawful rate within city
limits where there were blind crossings. On account of the speed
of defendant's train, after discovery of plaintiff, who was negligent
himself in going upon the crossing, it could not be stopped in time
07
to prevent a collision. Plaintiff was allowed to recover.
Plaintiff, a pedestrian, negligently walks out into the traffic at a
street crossing. Defendant sees plaintiff and could stop except for

the fact that he is driving a car equipped with defective brakes, or
at such a rapid rate that he cannot stop, although if his car had been
equipped with good brakes, or if he had been driving with due care,
he could have stopped. Plaintiff is run over and hurt. Should plaintiff be allowed to recover?
not used in precisely the same sense in fixing a negligent defendant's liability
and a negligent plaintiff's disability."--Pollock, The Law of Torts (12 ed.,
1923), p. 469.
White v. Carolina Realty Co., 182 N. C. 536, 109 S. E. 504 (1921);
Albritton v. Hill, 190 N. C. 429, 130 S. E. 5 (1925); Etheridge v. Norfolk
Southern R. Co., 129 S. E. 680 (Va., 1925).

'Loach v. British Col. Elec. Ry. Co., Privy Council (1916), 1 Appeal
Cases 719. See also Brenner v. Toronto Ry. Co., 13 Ont. Law Rep. 423, Canadian Law of Motor Vehicles (1926), p. 484-6; but see Smith v. City of
Regina, 34 Doam. L. R. 238.
"Dent v. Bellows Falls & S. R. St. Ry. Co., 95 Vt. 523, 116 Atl. 83 (1922);
Lloyd v. Albemarle & R. R. Co., 118 N. C. 1010, 24 S. E. 805 (1896).
Goben v. Quincy 0. & K. C. R. Co. (Mo. App.), 226 S. W. 631; Mason
United Rys. of St. Louis, 296 Mo. 66, 246 S. W. 3 R. (1922) ; see also Moore
v. St. Louis Transit Co., 194 Mo. 1, 12, 92 S. W. 390, and other cases cited in
Goben case. Also see 27 Harvard Law Rev. 757; 4 Texas Law Rev. 394.
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The number of such situations which may arise as the result of
steam, electric and gasoline motor transportation are many. If the
exception stated shall be generally recognized the doctrine of contributory negligence will be still further qualified.
In the cases passing on the point the courts have indulged two
fallacies. In the first place they have tried to determine the cases
on the ground of proximate cause, and in most of them the conclusion has been that the defendant was the sole proximate cause and
plaintiff's contributory negligence was a remote cause, a condition,
etc. A discussion on such a basis is as idle as those instances we
have already considered. That both parties were negligent and that
the negligence of tioth contributed appreciably to plaintiff's injury
is too clear for argument.
In the second place the courts have sought to invoke the "last
clear chance" exception. This, too, is futile, for in all the instances
on record the defendant has done all in his power to stop after discovering plaintiff's peril. Even so able a writer as Sir John Salmond, seeing that in most instances the injured party had, in fact,
the last clear chance, is inclined to think the "last clear chance"
exception has not yet been correctly stated or at least needs qualification.6 8 The observations made by Salmond are valid, and he
should have seen that what is called for in these instances is a corollary
to the last clear chance exception-merely anotherqualification of the
contributory negligence rule. It, of course, might be considered as
an extension of the last clear chance exception, but it would be rather
difficult to state it as such, and it is easier to consider it merely as a
corollary to that exception. At least there is sufficient basis for these
decisions without departing from good sense, whatever terminology
may be employed to designate the breach made thereby in the contributory negligence rule. It might possibly be termed the "first clear
chance."
The instrumentalities under defendant's control in these cases are
dangerous to human life and limb unless kept under control, and
unless the means of control are adequate. The experience of operators is such that they know their cars will meet many emergencies
in which others will be found in perilous situations. Normal experience does not warrant the assumption that others will always act
prudently;69 we know better. Under the law as it now is, these
" Salmond, The Law of Torts, 6 ed. 1921, 42-44.

' See Jaroszewski v. Chicago Railways Co., 241 Ill. App. 1 (1926).
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dangerous situations impose the duty to use every reasonable means
at hand to avoid such injuries when the dangers are discovered, and
in most cases even to keep a lookout in order to discover them. If
the defendant is negligent in providing his car with the means of
controlling it in such situations, is there anything unjust in placing
upon him the risk which could have been successfully prevented had
his car been properly equipped? Would not such a requirement
stand upon the same sound policy as that on which the rules of
negligence, contributory negligence, and the "last clear chance" exception, are all based? It is the defendant who is enjoying the ride
or making the profit from the operation of such machines as make
the highway perilous. While his activity is lawful and desirable,
yet he is not on equal footing with the plaintiff he hurts; he enjoys
every advantage. He runs little risk of hurt from plaintiff's negligence, either physically or financially; plaintiff has an excess of both
risks. In addition defendant has the social utility of the machine
itself. Moreover, defendant knows that he is certain to meet with
these emergencies sooner or later, and he knows that they will be
created by his own fault in part, and should he not be under the
risk of making it safe, so far as reasonable means can do so-either
with brakes or insurance-for those he may expect to catch off their
guard? Is not the social interest in human life, as opposed to the
other interests involved, worth this much? It is enough here to say
that this is the only basis upon which recovery in these cases can be
placed, unless a much broader collapse of the contributory negligence rule is to take place. And courts will accept or reject it as
their sense of fair play, social well-being, and desirable policy, approves or disapproves it. Proximate causation has no contribution
to make to this problem; no more than to any of the others. The
exception might well be limited to those instances in which the defendant had the last clear chance, but was unable to take advantage
of it by reason of operating his machine without proper controls.
Nor is it any objection that the exception would apply only to the
operations of the instrumentalities of rapid transportation which we
employ in our social and economic life.
CONCLUSION

The rules of law pertaining to negligent conduct are simple; they
have been made complex, difficult of understanding and application
by a useless resort to the mysticism of words. Perhaps this was
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necessary in the growth of the law as in every other science. But
the fashioning of the law has been the courts' responsibility and it
is theirs now to clarify. The courts by the mere process of forgetting-refusing to carry forward in their opinions the refuse which
has been generated by the judicial process in fashioning the lawcan give the only effective restatement of the law. This is expecting
nothing beyond their power or proper function. If they could call
into being the rules of conduct we label the law of negligence, they
can refine those rules of the dross with which they are encumbered.
Then we shall hear no more of "proximate cause."

